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Monitoring of the Helsinki Accords: Belgrade 1977
by Constance Coughlin*
O N AUGUST 1, 1975, following many months of negotiations, the
United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, and every European state
except for Albania signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe, known as the Helsinki Accords. The Final
Act covered a broad range of political, economic, and humanitarian
issues of mutual concern. The fourth provision of the Final Act,
"Basket Four," provided for a followup conference at Belgrade,
Yugoslavia, in 1977 in order to proceed
to a thorough exchange of views both on the implementation of the
provisions of the Final Act and of the tasks defined by the Con-
ference, as well as, in the context of the questions dealt with by the
latter, on the deepening of their mutual relations, the improvement
of security and the development of cooperation in Europe, and the
development of the process of detente in the future.'
The Helsinki Accord was a complex compromise between the
Soviet desire for hegemony in Eastern Europe and the West's desire for
an international codification of human rights. How to monitor these
agreements was the issue at Belgrade.2 Much of the constructive poten-
tial of the Conference has yet to be realized. The publication of the
Final Act of 1975 stimulated significant expectations of change in
governmental conduct, which expectations have been unrealized in
some instances and only partially realized in many others.
An evaluation will be made of the progress of this monitoring pro-
cess and of the problems disclosed in the course of the Conference.
After briefly outlining the provisions of the Helsinki Accord significant
in the area of human rights, the attempt to monitor the Accord's im-
plementation and the limited success of the current talks will be
analyzed.
The Final Act was divided into "Baskets" for negotiating and draft-
ing purposes, each "Basket" retaining its distinct status, although the
Act is considered a single document.' The provisions relating to securi-
*J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University, 1980.
1 TIME. Aug. 15, 1977, at 30.
2 Id. at 29.
1 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975,
14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1293 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Helsinki Accords].
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ty, the so-called Basket One, and particularly the Declaration on Prin-
ciples Guiding Relations between Participating States, constitutes an
impressive statement of high intentions. Many of the provisions,
however, are merely reformulations of a number of multilateral in-
struments, such as the United Nations Charter, the United Nations
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations,4 and bilateral agreements such as the
Soviet-West German Treaty of 1970 and the Basic Principles of the
Relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. of 1972.1
The text of the Principles closely parallels the principles enunciated
in the United Nations Friendly Relations Declaration, which was
primarily the result of a Soviet initiative to codify the notion of
peaceful coexistence as a matter of international law. 6
Principle VII of Basket One, the Declaration on Principles Guiding
Relations between Participating States, concerns "respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought,
conscience, religion or belief."7 The provisions of Principle VII are not
new in that they resemble very closely the language of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. 8 What is significant about them,
however, is the reaffirmation of the principle in this highly political
document on peace and security, an act which underscores the belief
that human rights and their implementation are matters of interna-
tional concern, both in their own right and because of their relation-
ship to peace and security.9 In Principle VII the participating states
agreed to "endeavor jointly and separately, including in cooperation
with the United Nations, to promote universal and effective respect for
them [human rights and fundamental freedoms]."' 0 Thus the par-
ticipating states have recognized that human rights issues are
legitimate subjects for bilateral and multilateral negotiations, as well as
1 G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 85, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970).
66 DEFT STATE BULL. 898 (1972).
McWhinney, The "New" Countries and the "New" International Law: The
United Nations' Special Conference on Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among
States, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1966).
' Helsinki Accords, supra note 3, Principle VII.
8 G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), arts. 2 & 18.
9 Comment, The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Implica-
tions for Soviet-American Detente, 6 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL., 122, 137 (1976).
10 Helsinki Accords, supra note 3, Principle VII, para. 6.
[Vol. 10:511
HELSINKI CONFERENCE
within the framework of the United Nations. This recognition of the
proper scope of concern, in conjunction with the 1977 followup con-
ference in Belgrade, has provided an important tool for the West in
dealing with the Soviet Union and other Communist 'bloc countries."
The signatory nations committed themselves to "honor and en-
courage the exercise of those civil, political, economic, social, cultural,
religious and minority rights Western political thought has considered
a buffer between the individual and the State power."' 2 Principle VII
explicitly recognizes the right of national minorities to "equality before
the law [and] . . . the actual enjoyment of human rights and fun-
damental freedoms." The states further agreed to protect their [the
minorities'] legitimate interests in this sphere.' s
Also relevant to the human rights issue is Basket Three, which was
adopted by the participants
conscious that increased cultural and education exchanges, broader
dissemination of information, contacts between people, and the solu-
tion of humanitarian problems will contribute to the attainment of
these aims [the strengthening of peace and understanding among
peoples and to the spiritual enrichment of the human personality].1'4
This again constitues recognition, albeit in a non-legal document, of
the international nature of issues of human rights and contacts.
The major significance of the Basket Three provisions-and the
aspect which made their use possible in the context of the followup
conference-is that they provide a number of specific methods to
enhance transnational communication, contacts, and cooperation, and
provide for unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral means to discuss and
achieve these ends. To a great degree, what the Final Act does,
therefore, is to give both specific content to many of the more general
human rights principles in the context of a conference of European
states, and to create a process for continuing consideration and
negotiation of these specific ends, and for evaluation of compliance
with them.I s
1 Comment, supra note 9, at 138.
"2 COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, HOUSE COMM. ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE
ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Two
YEARS AFTER HELSINKI. 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977).
13 Helsinki Accords, supra note 3, Principle VII, para. 4.
14 Id. Preamble, paras. 1, 2.
11 Comment, supra note 9, at 138.
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Basket Three consists of four sections. Section One deals with
human contacts, the participants "mak[ing] it their aim to faciliatate
freer movement and contacts . . . declare their readiness . . . to con-
clude agreements or arrangements among themselves, as may be need-
ed. . ." and to implement those aims.' 6
Among the provisions of Section One are those dealing with con-
tacts and regular meetings on the basis of family ties,' 7 and reunifica-
tion of families across national frontiers,' those dealing with marriage
between citizens of different states,' 9 facilitation of travel for personal
or professional reasons,2 0 improvement of conditions for tourism,2 ' en-
couragement of meetings among young people,22 and other expansion
of transnational contacts. 23
Section Two was designed to "facilitate the freer and wider
dissemination of information of all kinds,"2 4 in order to contribute "to
the growth of confidence between peoples."" .Thus the participating
states expressed their intention to improve the circulation of, access to,
and exchanges of all kinds of information.2 6 They agreed to facilitate
dissemination of oral information,2 7 printed information in the form of
newspapers, periodicals, and other publications,28 and filmed and
broadcast information. 29
Section Three deals with cooperation and exchanges in the field of
culture. The participants agreed to extend relations between govern-
mental and non-governmental organizations, increase mutual
knowledge between cultures, and to promote fuller access to books and
artistic works and performances, etc.30
16 Helsinki Accords, supra note 3, sec. 1, Preamble, paras. 5, 6.
17 Id. sec. 1(a).
18 Id. sec. l(b).
19 Id. sec. 1(c).
20 Id. sec. l(d).
21 Id. sec. 1(e).
22 Id. sec. I(f).
2" Id. sec. 1(g).
24 Id. sec. 2, Preamble, para. 6.
21 Id. para. 2.
26 Id. sec. 2(a).
21 Id. sec. 2(a)(i). The Soviets, however, refused to agree to cease jamming
Western radio broadcasts.
28 Id. sec. 2(a)(ii).
29 Id. sec. 2(a)(iii).
10 Id. sec. 3.
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Section Four deals with cooperation and exchanges in the field of
education, including improvement of access for foreign students and
teachers, and cooperation in research in the sciences and humanities. 3'
Of special relevance is a provision recognizing the contribution and
rights of minorities or regional cultures in the fields of cultural and
educational exchanges.3 2 This became a critical point in the re-
evaluation at Belgrade.
Basket Four, dealing with the followup to the Helsinki Conference,
provided for the first evaluation of the implementation of the Accord
in Belgrade in 1977 and the continuing re-evaluation thereafter. The
effect of this provision was to hopefully make each participating state
more aware of its commitments. The participants resolved to act to
implement the provisions of the Final Act through unilateral actions,"3
bilateral negotiations, 34 and multilaterally, by meetings of experts and
within the framework of existing international organizations, such as
the Economic Commission for Europe and UNESCO. 31
The fact that the Final Act is not a treaty or a legal document has
been emphasized by many commentators.3" The document has been
termed merely a "declaration of good intentions" and a "statement of
political resolve."3 The current stalemate at Belgrade seems to in-
dicate that this de-emphasis by commentators may be more than mere
cynicism. Although the present conference is not producing results in
terms of its members renewing the spirit of the Helsinki Accord, its
very existence has had far-reaching effects on the states' foreign and
domestic policies of the last two years.
For seven weeks during the summer of 1977, the members met to
arrange the agenda for the full-scale conference to be held in the fall.
The summer Belgrade meeting decided that:
1. a thorough review of how states have respected the accord, in-
cluding its human rights provision, would be the first item discussed;
2. the fall session would have decision-making powers, and;
3. the Conference would run from October 4 to December 22. If
drafting of a full report is not completed by then, the Conference
s1 Id. sec. 4.
11 Id. sec. 3, 4.
13 Id. sec. I(a).
34 Id. sec. 1(b).
11 Id. sec. 1(c).
36 See, e.g., TIME, Aug. 4, 1975, at 16; U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 4,
1975, at 18.
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would reconvene for an extra month. As of this writing, the Con-
ference is nearing the end of the extra month, and no agreement as to
the content of that final document has yet been reached.
The opening addresses at the fall Conference produced a catalogu-
ing by both Western and Eastern spokesmen of alleged violations of
the Helsinki Accord by the other side. In his opening address, United
States chief delegate Arthur Goldberg pointed to categories of viola-
tions in Soviet bloc countries but without mentioning specific countries
or cases. He called for "respect for those people who in their own
countries are trying to implement the agreement. '3 8 The reserved
nature of this assault was perhaps engendered by the worry that Presi-
dent Carter's outspoken criticism of the Soviet Union's implementation
of the Accord in the area of human rights would insure that nation's
absence at future followup conferences3 9 with the consequent damage
to a dozen years of detente.
The opening address by the Soviet delegate Vorontsov declared
that the new Soviet Constitution just adopted embodied all the basic
principles of the Helsinki Accord. Articles 50 and 52 of the new Con-
stitution provide that:
Citizens shall be guaranteed freedom of speech, press, assembly,
meetings, street processions, and demonstrations . ..The privacy of
citizens, of correspondence, telephone conversations, and telegraphic
communications shall be protected by law.4 0
He warned, however, that "cooperation in humanitarian and other
fields is only possible if all countries refrain from interfering in each
other's affairs." 4' The policy of supremacy of national sovereignty in
this area reflects the view expressed by Leonid Brezhnev on May 24,
1977, addressing the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, that:
The rights and freedoms of citizens cannot and must not be used
against our social system to damage the interests of the Soviet people...
It is necessary for every Soviet citizen to understand clearly that the
main guarantee of his rights in the final analysis is the might and
prosperity of our homeland. 42
31 TIME, Aug. 4, 1975, at 16.
31 NEWSWEEK, Oct. 10, 1977, at 49.
39 The next conference is tentatively scheduled for 1979 in Madrid.
40 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 20, 1977, at 18.
41 TIME, Oct. 17, 1977, at 36.
41 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 20, 1977, at 18.
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Thus began an endless progression of speech-making at the Con-
ference. Before going on to the actual accusations expressed, it would
be useful to briefly describe the development of monitoring machinery
by the United States.
Concern expressed by the United States, particularly on the human
rights problem, that the United States might possibly be giving in to
Soviet demands in some areas while the Soviets would be ignoring the
very positive statements on human rights embodied in the Final Act,
led to the establishment of a special Government Commission to
monitor implementation of the Helsinki agreement. This development
in turn produced a critical analysis of Eastern European and Russian
emigration policies and led its members to contact and support dissi-
dent groups and individuals in these areas. The Commission concluded
that "in a few Warsaw Pact states there have been rather limited signs
of official willingness to accept Helsinki human rights standards as they
have grown and become established in the West." 43 The Commission
criticized the Soviet Union for:
1. restrictions on emigration of Jewish citizens and on their
religious practices;
2. stifling of written expression (of prominent dissidents such as
Andrei Sakharov);
3. suppression of the cultural identity of minorities such as the
Ukrainians, Tartars, Latvians, etc.;
4. exit and entry restrictions on visits to relatives outside the
country. The Commission also was critical of the Accord for not hav-
ing set up specific enforcement machinery. 44
Its detailed statistics were tools for criticism leveled at the Soviet
Union and the Communist bloc countries at the Belgrade meeting time
and time again. Representatives of Western countries spoke out against
the trial of human rights activists in Czechoslovakia. Without mention-
ing Czechoslovakia by name, the Western delegates made it clear that
they were talking about the Prague trial of playwright Vaclav Havel,
journalist Jiri Lederer, and theater directors Ota Ornest and Frantisek
Paylicek. The four, who had supported the "Charter '77" human
rights manifesto in Czechoslovakia, were charged with subversion by
publishing material critical of the Communist regime. French delegate
Alain Pierret said his government wanted "to deplore again that
43 COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, supra note 12, at 8.
44 Id. at 11.
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obstacles and hindrances still exist in certain countries to the free flow
of ideas. '" 45
The name-calling and list making has not exactly been one-sided.
The Soviet Union delegation accused the United States of staging a
"propoganda show" at the meeting. 4" They documented American
unemployment statistics and racial discrimination with an eye to the
Communist eiiphasis on the right to a job, housing, education and
health care. They took to task the United States practices of denying
visitor visas to Soviet labor union officials and noted disruptions and
disorder at performances of Soviet artists as well as assaults against
Soviet offices and representatives in the West. 47 Yugoslavia entered its
complaint about the plight of a Slovene minority in Austria; and Por-
tugal raised the problem of its migrant "guest workers" in industrializ-
ed northern Europe.48
The human rights dispute is not merely a matter of fingers being
pointed at alleged "flagrant" repression of individuals. The American
and Soviet positions remain fundamentally irreconcilable. The
Americans charge that the Soviet law which allows prisoners to be de-
tained incommunicado and without legal advice for nine months is
violative of due process, 49 while the Russians claim that high
unemployment figures in America show a disregard for the fundamen-
tal human right to a job and economic security.
The Soviet dissidents and their families were themselves critical of
Western behavior at the talks. The approach of the Conference had
been used for more than a year by human rights advocates throughout
the Soviet orbit to give international standing to their allegations of
violations by their own regimes. The low-key strategy used by the
American delegation in recent weeks has led disappointed members of
"watch groups" and self-appointed monitors to accuse the United
States of "pulling its punches."' 0 The human rights provisions, are,
however, tied up with security and arms limitation provisions of the
other Baskets. If the human rights issue undercut detente, the Soviet
bloc dissidents would only be hurt in the long run.5 1 The complaint
41 Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Oct. 18, 1977, at 14a, col. 1.
41 N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1977, at A2, col. 3.
4' N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1978, at 32M, col. 1.
41 TIME. supra note 41.
49 NEWSWEEK. Jan. 2, 1978, at 28.
50 N.Y. Times, supra note 47.
51 NEWSWEEK, supra note 49.
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has been heard that "not a single prisoner has been freed by the
Belgrade process."52 Belgrade's success must be judged not only in
terms of prisoners freed but also in terms of prisoners not taken
because of the damaging publicity which would result in most cases.
The final statement in Belgrade will in all likelihood not contain
stronger human rights measures than those already contained in the
Final Act. The West wants a detailed list of violations of the Helsinki
Accord and pledges of better performance. Moscow wants a statement
that emphasizes security and minimizes human rights. The only
reference to human rights in the Soviet draft of the final statement
said that participating countries "stated their readiness to continue the
expansion of cooperation in humanitarian fields, as provided for in the
final act: human contacts, information, culture, and education."5 3
Because consensus is mandatory, the inevitable compromise will be
nearer Moscow's version of the Act. 54
In recent weeks the meetings have been remarkably deficient in
direct, formal dialogue. 55 The Eastern and Western delegates speak to
each other on two different levels; staid, dogmatic speeches during the
Conference, and increasing warmth and correspondence during the
off-hours. The growing candor outside of the conference room is not
surprising since some of the diplomats have been facing each other for
more than three years. Consequently it is unlikely that any earth-
shattering conclusions will be made in the near future.
The Belgrade process should not be underestimated, however.
Although few fully realized it two years ago, the Helsinki Final Act was
a deeply subversive document. It made the behavior of governments
toward their own citizens a matter of legitimate international concern
and review. The invocation of "non-interference" and "domestic
jurisdiction," claims likely to be raised, is less powerful in light of
multilateral discussions of the issues. The American Commission on the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, established as a
monitoring group, needs to broaden its horizons, and at the same time
turn its sights westward. The self-righteous statistical analysis presented
by American critics of Eastern domestic policy seems to have selectively
ignored the treatment of American Indians, Algerians in France,
prisoners in Northern Ireland, and numerous migrant labor popula-
12 N.Y. Times, supra note 47.
53 N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1978, at A4, col. 2.
14 N.Y. Times, supra note 47.
16 Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Jan. 17, 1978, at 7A, col. 1.
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tions throughout Western Europe. For whatever reasons, (perhaps the
fact that the Conference is being conducted behind closed doors) the
Russians have not walked out of Belgrade, which means that it is likely
they plan to return two years from now to try and redirect world opin-
ion.
Even if the Conference quietly ends with a round of platitude-filled
speeches, the reaffirmation of the Helsinki Accord and the on-going
process will not be totally ineffectual. By discussing issues of human
rights and contacts in a multilateral forum, and by agreeing to work
independently and jointly, where necessary, to achieve the objectives of
the Final Act, s6 the participants have recognized that these issues will
never again be purely internal matters to be hidden from international
view. 7
11 Helsinki Accords, supra note 3, Preamble, para. 3.
57 On March 8, 1978, the Belgrade Conference adopted a summary document
that did not mention human rights. The agreement did little more than "reaffirm the
resolve of governments to implement fully all of the provisions" of the 1975 Helsinki
agreements. The topic was avoided in the hope that the nations would agree to con-
tinue the Helsinki process, and to vitiate warnings from nations such as Czechoslovakia
and East Germany, whose ambassadors condemned attempts to raise the question of
human rights as "interference in our internal affairs." One East German official sug-
gested that future efforts to raise questions of human rights violations in Eastern
Europe would be "dangerous to the cause of detente." The provisions of the Helsinki
agreements will be reviewed again in Madrid in November, 1980.
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